STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 367, cites many cases to support the statement: There is no safer or better settled canon of interpretation than where language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it clearly expresses.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS—SALE—LICENSE—EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY OF LICENSEE.—Defendant at bankrupt sale of one L., a retail liquor dealer, purchased his stock of goods and then resold the same to L., taking in payment L.'s personal note and a mortgage on the stock as security therefor. A written agreement was entered into whereby until the whole purchase price should be paid, defendant should act as manager of the property. On appeal from conviction under an indictment for retailing liquor without a license, *held*, the bankruptcy of a liquor licensee does not cancel his privilege to sell under the license subsequent to adjudication of bankruptcy. From the entire transaction defendant was in effect an employe of the licensee to conduct the business until the purchase price was paid and therefore was under the protection of the license. *Barnard* v. *State*, (1909), — Ala. —, 48 South. 483.

Where the assignment of a liquor license is permitted by statute the licensee has such property rights in the license as will pass it as an asset to the trustee in bankruptcy. *In re May*, 5 Am. B. R. 1; *In re Brodline*, 93 Fed. 643; *In re Fisher*, 98 Fed. 89. The license is not assignable in the absence of statutory authority. *State* v. *McNeely*, 60 N. C. 232; *In re Blumenthal*, 125 Pa. St. 412, 18 Atl. 395. In Alabama a license to retail liquors is a personal permit merely. *Powell's Case*, 69 Ala. 10. It is therefore not an asset subject to the demands of creditors and cannot afford protection to another than the licensee or his representative in the conduct of a retailing business. 23 CYC. 155. In the above case the title to the license still being in L. after adjudication in bankruptcy, by the repurchase of stock from defendant, L. became principal owner and defendant acting as his agent was entitled to the protection of the license.

JUDGMENT—ENTRY ON SUNDAY—EFFECT.—On appeal from a judgment it was pleaded that the appeal was prematurely taken for the reason that the judgment had not been entered of record until after the appeal was perfected. Then motion was made to ascertain the time when the judgment was entered of record. It was found that the time could not be determined with certainty, but that it was not before October 1, 1905; thereupon the court corrected the record to show October 1, 1905, as the date that the judgment was entered of record, and the appeal was dismissed as being prematurely taken. Then appellant raised the question that October 1, 1905, fell upon Sunday, and contended that the judgment was therefore void. *Held*, that while, under the Iowa practice, an appeal cannot be perfected until the judgment has been entered of record, still the entering of the judgment is merely a ministerial, and not a judicial act, and would not avoid the judgment even if the entry was made on Sunday. *Puckett* v. *Guenther*, (1909), — Ia. —, 120 N. W. 123.